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Abstract 
We investigate the effects of (i) profit distribution to either laborers or capital-owners, 
(ii) sector-specific or efficient rationing schemes, and (iii) government consumption in 
a two-sector disequilibrium growth model with sluggish real wage rate adjustment 
(which affects capital accumulation). 
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1. Introduction 
Two different strands of economic literature have recently received wide- 
spread attention: growth theory and neo-Keynesian disequilibrium econ- 
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omits. This attention, aimed at solving some shortcomings of the existing 
literature, is applaudable as growth effects are ultimately more important 
than level effects and the ubiquitous nature of market disequilibrium is 
almost undisputed. However, the recent contributions fail to integrate the 
two approaches or to address two problems in particular. First, the Neo- 
Keynesian theories of market disequilibrium are static in nature because they 
lack an endogenous capital accumulation process (which in general will 
influence the type of short-run equilibrium studied in these models). This 
holds not only for the ‘old’ Neo-Keynesian literature but also for the ‘Neo- 
Neo’ (or New) Keynesians.’ Second, growth theory analyzes the impact of 
(human) capital accumulation over time, but fails to analyze the conse- 
quences of market disequilibrium. Again this holds both for the ‘old’ growth 
theory and for the ‘new’ (endogenous) growth theory.* Disequilibrium 
growth theory, introduced by Ito (1980), overcomes the static nature of 
disequilibrium economics and the equilibrium nature of growth theory and 
integrates the two approaches by simultaneously studying both short-run 
market disequilibrium and endogenous capital accumulation over time that 
will affect the short-run equilibrium. 
A technical problem arises in the theory of disequilibrium growth as the 
possibility of switches in the short-run disequilibrium regime, say from 
unemployment to excess demand, gives rise to a discontinuity in the 
investment scheme. This, in turn, implies that the differential equations 
describing the dynamic evolution of the economy have discontinuous right 
hand sides. Following Ito (1980), and others, we employ the Filippov (1960) 
solution concept, which generalizes the theory of ordinary differential 
equations and allows us to cope with discontinuities and multivaluedness of 
the vector field. 
Since its introduction by Ito disequilibrium growth theory has not received 
the attention it deserves.3 Honkapohja and Ito (1983) and Eckwert and 
Schittko (1988) give further developments of the Filippov technique. 
Honkapohja and Ito (1982), Picard (1983) and Schittko and Eckwert (1985) 
investigate monetary versions of the neo-Keynesian model. Ginsburgh et al. 
(1985) study endogenous savings behavior in a Ramsey framework. Finally, 
van Marrewijk and Verbeek (1993a) study a two-sector model in a small 
open economy and van Marrewijk and Verbeek (1993b) investigate the 
implications of sector-specific capital. 
1 See Barro and Grossman (1971) or Benassy (1982), respectively Cooper and John (1988). Space 
limitations prompt us to list a few references only. A more extended list can be found in Verbeek 
(1993). 
‘See Solow (1956) respectively Romer (1986). 
3 This is partly caused by the technical dynamic problems alluded to above. 
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This article differs from existing disequilibrium growth theory in four 
respects (discussed sequentially in the rest of the paper). First, we extend the 
Ito (1980) model, which analyzes unemployment or excess-demand on the 
labor market, to two sectors, by recognizing the fact that consumption goods 
and investment goods are inherently different commodities, produced in two 
distinct sectors of the economy by employing capital and labor as inputs. 
Second, we investigate the effects of profit distribution to either the laborers 
or capital-owners on the disequilibrium growth path. Third, the introduction 
of a second sector enables us to analyze different rationing schemes, namely 
efficient rationing or rationing either the investment good sector or the 
consumption good sector. Fourth, we briefly investigate the impact of 
government consumption on the short-run and long-run behavior of the 
economy. 
The source of short-run disequilibrium in our model will be sluggish real 
wage rate adjustment. Numerous theories have been put forward to explain 
real or nominal stickiness. Blinder (1991), for example, recently reported 
about ongoing research (using interview studies) on 12 theories of sluggish 
adjustment. His preliminary conclusion is that adjustment is indeed sluggish: 
the mean response lag between a change in demand or cost and an 
adjustment is 3 to 4 months and less than 15% of GNP is repriced more 
frequently than quarterly. The production functions in the two sectors of the 
economy, the consumption good sector and the investment good sector, are 
characterized by constant returns to scale, which enables the model to be 
written in per capita form. We retain the Solow (1956) assumption of fixed 
savings rates, but allow for these rates to be different for capital-owners and 
laborers. 
If there is excess-demand for labor in a one-sector disequilibrium growth 
model the rationing scheme used to allocate the available supply of laborers 
is trivial as there is only one sector to be rationed. Analyzing a two-sector 
disequilibrium growth model necessarily entails the introduction of a non- 
trivial rationing scheme to distribute the available supply of labor over the 
two sectors if the demand for labor is rationed. First, we will investigate an 
efftcient rationing scheme that has the two basic properties, voluntary 
exchange and market efficiency, stressed in the literature, see e.g. Benassy 
(1982). More specifically, it is assumed that the short side rule holds and that 
in the excess-demand regime labor will be allocated to the two sectors so as 
to equalize the value marginal product of labour. As a result of efficient 
rationing the profits per worker, and hence the marginal incentive for a 
producer to employ a worker in his company, will be equal in the two 
sectors. Second, we investigate priority rationing, see e.g. Benassy (1982, 
p. 128) or Picard (1983, p. 275). Sometimes a particular agent (usually the 
government) gets priority. Alternatively, a specific sector of the economy can 
get priority, perhaps because it is designated to be of ‘strategic interest’ by 
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the government. For example, the investment good industry is allowed, at the 
current below-equilibrium wage rate, to employ as many laborers as it wants, 
such that the labor shortage shows up exclusively in the consumption goods 
sector. 
The results derived in this paper will be stated precisely and have been 
proven formally, but will be discussed tersely and informally. Detailed proofs 
of the short-term existence propositions and the results on efficient rationing 
can be found in Verbeek (1993), while details on sector-specific rationing are 
available from the authors upon request. 
2. The model 
2.1. Full employment 
Sector 1, the numeraire, produces investment goods, Y,, while sector 2 
(with relative price p) produces consumption goods, Y,.4 Both sectors 
produce under constant returns to scale and use labor, L, and capital, K, as 
inputs. The intensive form of the production functions (f,(k,),i= 1,2) is 
well-behaved and satisfies the Inada conditions.5 Laborers (capital-owners) 
save a fraction s, (s,) out of their income, with 0~ S,,S, d 1. Firms in each 
sector maximize profits taking prices, the wage rate, w, and the rental rate, Y, 
as given. Because of perfect capital and labor mobility between the two 
sectors both factors of production will be fully used and the rental rate and 
the wage rate are the same in both sectors. If the firms are on their demand 
curves for labor and capital, the wage rate and the rental rate will be equal 
to the value marginal product of labor (VMPL) and capital, respectively. 
Hence, if ui is the ratio of marginal productivities in sector i, oi(ki) = 
(fi/fi) - ki for i = 1,2, then oi =w2 = o, say. Note that oi = -f;:fr/(fi)’ E ti > 
0 and that the sectorial elasticities of substitution oi are given by oi=oi/(kiti). 
The short-run full employment model as discussed above becomes 
yi = Zifi(ki), i = 1,2, (1) 
y, = s,rk + s,w, (2) 
w=fi -k,f; =dfrkzf;l~ (3) 
r=Yl=p”f;, (4) 
“The choice of numeraire is immaterial for the static properties of the model, the local 
propositions below or efficient rationing if laborers receive the profits, but might affect 
Propositions 3 and 4fii). We are grateful to an anonymous referee for pointing this out. 
‘All lower case variables are per-capita, except ki which equals KJLi and price variables, p, r 
and w. 
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I,+I,=l, (5) 
k=k,l, +k,l,, (6) 
w=(fi/f:)-k, i= 1,2. (7) 
It is well known, see Drandakis (1963), that the short-run full employment 
equilibrium exists and is unique if o1 +a,2 1. Moreover, the wage rate that 
guarantees full employment, call it w*(k), is a rising function of k. In the long 
run the capital-labor ratio changes because agents save part of their income 
and invest this in new investment goods. Labor is supplied perfectly 
inelastically and grows exponentially at rate n. The capital accumulation 
equation can then be written as 
k=y,-(6+n)k, (8) 
where a dot above a variable denotes the first derivative with respect to time 
and 6 is the non-negative depreciation rate. Let rrr=((o/k)(dk/do) be the 
economy-wide elasticity of substitution in the full employment regime. 
Several sufficient conditions for existence, uniqueness and stability of a long- 
run steady state E, with concomitant ti= w*(/& are known. We will use 
o,> 1, which holds if cl, a,2 1. 
2.2. Disequilibrium 
In the full employment regime the wage rate adjusts instantly to pressure 
in the labor market to clear this market. Now, we introduce sluggish real 
wage rate adjustment such that there may be unemployment or excess- 
demand in the labor market. The short-run wage rate is then exogenously 
given. The actual quantity traded is determined by the short side rule, 
,!,= min {Ld, Ls}, where Ld is the quantity of labor demanded and L” the 
quantity supplied. We distinguish between the unemployment regime 
(U; Ld< L”) and the excess-demand regime (E; Ld> L”). The full employment 
regime, analyzed above, is the boundary between the two regimes. The 
regimes are described by the two state variables k and w. It is the exogeneity 
of w, that causes the possibility of disequilibrium in the labor market. The 
analysis of the unemployment regime and the excess-demand regime has to 
distinguish between per capita variables obtained by dividing by the amount 
of labor demanded (indicated by a superscript d) on the one hand and per 
capita variables obtained by dividing by the amount of labor supplied on the 
other hand. Define yp = Y-JLd, kt= KJLf, 1:~ LtJLd, ki= K,lLf, Ii = Lf/L”. The 
adjustment equation for the wage rate assumes, as usual, that the wage rate 
reacts to pressure in the labor market, i.e. 
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W=cj i-1 _d,{k,w) for j=E,U; ij>O. 
i i 
Note that we allow for different adjustment parameters (ii) in the two 
regimes, i.e. the downward adjustment of wages in unemployment may be 
slow, while the upward adjustment of wages in excess demand may be fast. 
2.2.1. Unemployment 
In the unemployment regime the wage rate is too high, w > w*(k), to offer 
everyone a job, i.e. Ld<Ls. The producers are on their demand curve for 
labor, employing people up to the point where the VMPL equals the wage 
rate. Wages determine the amount of labor hired and the demanded capital- 
labor ratio (kd= kd(w) = w*(w)). Analysis of the unemployment regime is 
straightforward because we only have to substitute yp, 14, kf and kd for yi, Ii, 
ki and k respectively in Eqs. (1)47). Hence the following proposition follows 
easily, see also Ito (1980)6. 
Proposition 1. The short-run unemployment equilibrium exists and is unique. 
The state variables evolve according to w <0 and k 50 iff w 2 6, provided 
0,Z 1. 
2.2.2. Excess-demand 
In the excess-demand regime, WC w*(k), two things are important. First, 
profits are made as the wage rate deviates from the VMPL. These profits can 
go either to the laborers or to the capital-owners. Second, the type of 
rationing scheme of labor over the two sectors matters as the demand for 
labor exceeds the available supply. We will investigate three different 
rationing schemes: (i) efficient rationing, equalizing the VMPL in both 
sectors, (ii) rationing of the consumption good sector, and (iii) rationing of 
the investment good sector. Therefore we need to rewrite the gross invest- 
ment equation (2): 
y, = s,rk + s,w + s,( VMPL, - w)l,, (2’) 
where, as will be explained below, s, = s, s; VMPL, is the value marginal 
product of labor in the profit making sector(s); and 1, is the fraction of labor 
employed in the profit making sector(s). As the static and dynamic properties 
of the model crucially hinge upon the rationing scheme and profit distribu- 
6 More specifically, in full employment capital accumulates according to k= c$(k)k, for some 
function C$ characterized by d(k)=0 iff E= k provided cr,> 1, while in unemployment capital 
accumulates according to f = +(k“(w))k. 





Fig. 1. Dynamic behavior in the benchmark case: Laborers receive the profits and rationing is 
efficient. 
tion, the sequel of the paper will investigate the various possibilities in this 
respect. 
3. Profit distribution and effkient rationing 
If rationing is efficient labor is allocated such as to equalize the VMPL in 
the two sectors, and hence profits per worker. Eq. (3) becomes 
w<fi-W;=PU---J;). (3’) 
First, we discuss profit distribution and, second, we examine stability. 
3.1. Laborers receive the profits (the benchmark case) 
Due to efficient rationing the VMPL is the same in both sectors and both 
sectors make a profit, hence I, = 1. Distributing profits to the laborers, s, = s,, 
amounts to a roundabout way of paying them their VMPL. Hence Eq. (2’) 
reduces to Eq. (2) which implies that production in both sectors is equal to 
the production level at full employment (given k). Therefore, capital accumu- 
lates (decumulates) iff k is smaller (larger) than I;, which gives the following 
proposition (illustrated in Fig. 1): 
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Proposition 2. If laborers receive the profits and rationing is efficient the 
short-run excess-demand equilibrium exists and is unique if o1 +a, 2 1. The 
state variables evolve according to w > 0 and k 2 0 ty k 2 k, provided or 2 1. 
Ito (1980) implicitly assumes that capital-owners receive the profits. He 
then derives that the k =0 locus is vertical in the excess-demand regime iff 
laborers and capital-owners have identical saving behavior (s, = sW). The same 
holds in the two-sector model if rationing is efficient (see below). However, 
Proposition 2 shows that it is more important to determine who gets the 
profits, because the k=O locus is always vertical in the excess-demand regime 
if profits go to the laborers (even if s, # s,). 
3.2. Capital-owners receive the profits 
Proposition 3. If capital-owners receive the profits and rationing is efficient 
the short-run excess-demand equilibrium exists and is unique. The k=O locus is 
given by the function w = b(k) tf s, # s, and vertical at k otherwise. The state 
variables evolve according to 6 > 0 and for the domain of 4, 
,650 l@T w$+(k) for s,>sr, and 
k$O ifl w $4(k) for s, < s,. 
Proposition 3, which follows from putting I,= 1 and s, =s, in (2’), implies 
that C#J is upward sloping if capital-owners save less than laborers (Fig. 2a) 
and downward sloping otherwise (Fig. 2b) and can be understood quite 
easily. If the saving behavior of the capital-owners is identical to the laborer’s 
saving behavior (s,=s,), then the economy behaves again as at full employ- 
ment. Starting, however, from a point in the excess-demand regime where 
k=k (like point A in Fig. l), combined with capital-owners, who save more 
than laborers (s~>s,), the demand for investment goods must increase (y, 
increases) while depreciation and population growth do not change ((6 + n)c 
remains the same) hence capital must still accumulate (&= yi -(a + n)k>O). 
This explains the downward slope of CJ if s,>s,. The same holds, mutatis 
mutandis, for s,<s,. The basic results are summarized in Table 1. 
4. Stability 
The ‘usual’ analysis for stability of a system of differential equations 
cannot be applied here without restrictions and modifications. This is caused 
by the fact that the system consists of two different sets of differential 
equations with the possibility of switching regimes. Define Rv E ((k, w)ER: ( 
w > w*(k)) and R, E {(k,w)ER: 1 WC w*(k)} , then the dynamic behavior of the 
model is given by 
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(a) 
0 1 -k 
Fig. 2. Dynamic behavior if rationing is eflicient: capital-owners receive the profits and (Fig. 2a) 
save less than the laborers or (Fig. 2b) save more than the laborers. 
With a discontinuity on the common boundary of Lebesgue-measure zero 
w = w*(k). The Filippov solution ignores vectors of direction on an arbitrary 
set of Lebesgue-measure z ro near a point of discontinuity. It is possible that 
the ‘patched up’ system is unstable although the two systems themselves are 
382 C. van Marrewijk, J. Verbeek / European Journal of Political Economy 10 (1994) 373-388 
Table 1 
Behavior in excess-demand if rationing is effkient; the k=O 
locus is given by w = d(k) 
w k 
(i) Laborers receive the profits (gl + oz 2 1) 
k, 0 + 
kz 0 + 
1, 0 ? 
Q=32 
(ii) Capital-owners receive the profits 
k, + iff (s,-s,)(k,-kz)<O 
k, + iN(s,-s,)(k,-kz)<O 
1, + iN(s,-s,)>O 
@>O if s,<s,, Go, bF> 1 




stable. It is clear from Figs. 1 and 2, however, that if s, =s,,, or S, = s, and 
s,<s, the system is globally stable if it arrives in the excess-demand regime 
without complete decapitalization. This is caused by the solution path getting 
‘locked in’ between w*(k) and 4(k) and approaching the long-run equilibrium 
point (&iv) asymptotically. Let CJ~ be the overall elasticity of substitution in 
the excess-demand regime and eE be cE evaluated at the steady state, then 
Proposition 4. With efficient rationing the system is globally asymptotically 
stable if 
(i) laborers receive the profits and oF 2 1 or 
(ii) capital-owners receive the profits and do not save more than laborers 
(s, G s,J together with o~,B~ 3 1. 
If 4 is downward sloping (s,=s, A s,<s,) it is not apparent that the 
system is stable. We can, however, get a local result. 
Proposition 5. With efficient rationing the system is locally asymptotically 
stable if capital-owners receive the profits and save more than laborers together 
with 
(i) k,<k, and a,31 or 
(ii) k,>k,, a,>,1 and 6.E>(kl-k)s,/s,(k1+o). 
The proof uses the fact that the individual dynamic systems are stable 
while it is clear that we cross the boundary if it is reached. Honkapohja and 
Ito (1983) show that under these conditions local stability holds. Note that 
gF> 1 and 6&q/s, are always sufficient conditions for local stability in the 
case described in Proposition 5. 
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5. Sector specific rationing 
This section briefly discusses the properties of a sector specific rationing 
scheme, which will be evaluated at the steady state. Suppose that, due to 
political pressure or otherwise, one sector will not be rationed if the economy 
is in excess-demand. The ‘privileged’ sector (the one that is not rationed) can 
fulfill its demand for labor at the current wage rate. Hence it is not making a 
profit (privileges have their drawbacks). 
5.1. The investment good industry is not rationed 
Suppose the investment good industry is not rationed. Then the wage rate 
equals the value marginal product of labor in the investment good sector, 
w= VMPL, =fi - k,f; which gives k, as a function of w. Naturally, the 
consumption good industry makes a profit, w < p( f2 - kJi). 
5.1 .I. Laborers receive the profits 
If the laborers receive the profits made in the consumption good sector we 
get s, =s,,,, VMPL,= VMPL, and I,= 1, in investment equation (2’). Look at 
point A in Fig. 1. If rationing were efficient (so the production of both goods 
would be rationed) k would be zero at this point. Now, however, the 
production of investment goods is not rationed, hence its production 
increases. Depreciation and population growth do not change ((6 +n)c 
remains the same), hence capital must accumulate at point A 
(k=y,-(6+n$>O). Therefore the It=0 locus is downward sloping in the 
excess-demand regime if the investment good industry is not rationed and 
laborers receive the profits (Fig. 2b). Alternatively, one can distinguish 
between two effects and argue as follows. At point A the wage rate is lower 
than 9, hence the capital-labor ratio in sector 1 is lower. Given I, this tends 
to decrease y,( = IIf,(k Producers in industry 1, however, are not rationed 
and can attract more laborers, which will increase 1,. Given k, this will tend 
to increase y,. As in excess-demand labor is the constraining factor the labor 
effect will dominate the capital intensity effect. 
5.1.2. Capital-owners receive the profits 
If the capital-owners receive the profits made in the consumption good 
sector we get s,=s,, VMPL,= VMPL, and I,= 1, in investment equation (2’). 
Again look at point A in Fig. 1. Two (possibly opposing) forces are at work 
at this point. First, rationing the consumption good market will increase the 
production of investment goods. Second, distributing part of the GNP to the 
capital-owners will increase the demand for investment goods only if they 
save more out of these profits. Hence the k=O locus will be downward 
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Table 2 
Behavior in excess-demand if investment goods are not 
rationed; the k=O locus is given by w= 4(k) 
w 
(i) Laborers receive the protits (cr2 > s,). 
k, + 
k, - (a,>l-s,) 
1, _ 
@tOifu,>l 




+ i 0 if s,( 1 -II) > s,, g2 > s,/s, 
sloping if s,lZ>s,. If, on the other hand, capital-owners save less out of 
profits than laborers we have two opposing forces at work. The rationing 
scheme tends to increase the production of investment goods, while profit 
distribution to the capital-owners tends to decrease the demand for these 
goods. The slope of the k=O locus cannot be determined without further 
information on the production functions and the size of the two savings 
rates. The qualifications and restrictions needed to derive the conclusions 
intuitively explained in this section are listed in Table 2. 
5.2. The consumption good industry is not rationed 
If the consumption good industry is not rationed the wage rate equals the 
value marginal product of labor in the consumption good sector, w= 
VMPL, =p(fi - k&). This time the investment good industry makes a 
profit (I,=/, and w <fi -k,f;). If laborers receive the profits the production 
of investment goods at point A in Fig. 1 decreases, so capital is decumulating 
at that point. Therefore the k = 0 locus must be upward sloping in the excess- 
demand regime, as in Fig. 2a. If capital-owners receive the profits we are 
again confronted with two (possibly opposing) forces. Rationing the invest- 
ment good industry tends to decrease production in this sector. This effect is 
reinforced from the demand side if profits are distributed to the capital- 
owners and they save less out of these profits than laborers (s,Z, <s,). Under 
this condition, then, the k =0 locus will be upward sloping (Fig. 2a). 
Otherwise (if capital-owners save more out of profits than laborers) the 
demand for investment goods will increase, a force that can potentially 
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Table 3 
Behavior in excess-demand if consumption goods are not 
rationed; the k =0 locus is given by w = &k) 
W k 
(i) Laborers receive the profits (crz as,, u, Zmax {s,, s,,,}). 
k, - (0221) + 
k, + (V1>l-S,) + 
11 + ? 
&>Oifu,>l 








counterbalance the rationing effect. Table 3 summarizes the conclusions and 
gives qualifications. 
6. Government consumption 
Introducing a government sector in the benchmark model enables us to 
analyze the effect of changes in government consumption on the disequili- 
brium growth path and the pressure in the labor market. The role of the 
government is limited. Tax revenues are used to buy consumption goods, 
r(y, +py,)=g, where g is government consumption and r is the tax rate to 
finance this consumption. Equilibrium in the investment good industry for 
the benchmark case becomes (y, = (1 - z)(s,w + s,rk) = s,w + s,rk -g) 
The balanced budget multipliers for each regime are easily calculated and 
summarized in Table 4. Naturally, an increase in government consumption 
will reduce the steady-state capital-labor ratio. Moreover, in the full- 
employment short-run it will pull laborers away from the investment good 
industry toward the consumption good industry. If the investment good 
industry is relatively capital intensive (k, > k,), the consumption good sector 
will need relatively more laborers than capital to produce the extra demand 
for consumption goods, hence k, and w* will rise and k2 will fall. In the 
unemployment regime changes in g are completely absorbed by changes in 
the overall demanded capital-labor ratio (kd) and the fractions of labor 
demanded in each sector (I‘j and 1;). Suppose we are at point B in Fig. 3, 
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Table 4 
Effects of an increase in government consumption (benchmark 
case) 
Full employment Unemployment Excess-demand 
L 
W* + iffk,>k, 
k, + iff k,>k, 0 + iffk,>k, 
k, _ iff k,>k, 0 + iffk,>k, 
1, _ _ _ 
kd _ iffk,>k, - iffk,>kz 
Yl _ _ 
I; k 
Fig. 3. The effect of an increase in government consumption if the investment good industry is 
relatively capital intensive. 
where part of the labor force is unemployed. Conventional wisdom has it 
that the government should increase its consumption to create extra demand 
and employ more laborers (g increases). If k, > k, this rotates the w*(k) locus 
counterclockwise up and reduces kd, hence indeed reduces the pressure in the 
labor market. If k, <k,, however, the w*(k) locus rotates clockwise down, kd 
increases and the pressure on the labor market increases. Therefore, an 
increase in government consumption in unemployment is only a wise policy 
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if the investment good industry is relatively capital intensive. This is 
intuitively plausible because the wage rate fixes kf and ki, whereas the 
increase in g increases demand for consumption goods and hence pulls 
laborers to this sector. Total labor employed will only increase if sector 2 
uses these laborers relatively more intensively (k, ck,). Similar arguments, 
necessary changes being made, hold for the excess-demand regime. It is 
important to note that these observations do not depend on a specific 
rationing scheme as it is only the w*(k) locus relative to the (k, w) point 
under investigation that matters, which in turn depends only on k, -k,. In 
concluding, the effects of discretionary government policy depend crucially 
on the relative capital intensities’. 
7. Conclusion 
We investigate a two-sector disequilibrium growth model with sluggish 
real wage rate adjustment. There is an explicit analysis of spill-over effects in 
a general (dis)equilibrium framework and simultaneous adjustment of prices 
and quantities in the long run as a sequence of short-run fixed price 
equilibria. We derive various global and local stability results by making 
sufficiently strong assumptions on the elasticities of substitution. 
Introduction of a second output sector makes the model more ‘Keynesian’, 
in the sense that more attention must be given to the rationing problem. We 
analyze both efficient rationing and sector-specific rationing. The difference in 
the rationing scheme used shows up exclusively in the excess-demand regime. 
Moreover, we note that in the excess-demand regime (where profits are being 
made) it is of significant importance to decide who gets these profits. There 
are two powers operative in excess-demand: profit distribution and the 
rationing scheme. Sometimes these powers will reinforce each other (for 
example if the investment good industry is not rationed, while profits go to 
the capital-owners who save more than laborers), sometimes they will 
contradict (idem if capital-owners save less). 
Extending the model with a government sector shows that an increase in 
government consumption in unemployment (excess demand) is only beneti- 
cial for the economy, i.e. will reduce pressure on the labor market, if and 
only if the investment good (consumption good) industry is relatively capital 
intensive. It is, therefore, of crucial importance for the government to know 
which industry is relatively capital intensive to achieve the desired result. The 
power of the government in a two-sector model is therefore much greater 
than in the Ito (1980) one-sector model because it cannot only influence the 
‘Government investment leads to similar conclusions, depending on the use of the investment 
goods. 
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long-run steady state and the dynamic path to it, but also alleviate short-run 
pressure on the labor market, i.e. ‘fine tune’ the economy, provided it has 
enough information on the workings of the economy. Naturally, the two- 
sector distinction must be non-trivial, i.e. the two sectors must be different 
and have different capital-labor ratios. Otherwise, the government is power- 
less in the short run. 
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